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This study analyzes the growth and welfare e¤ects of monetary policy in a two-
country Schumpeterian growth model with cash-in-advance constraints on consump-
tion and R&D investment. We nd that an increase in the domestic nominal interest
rate decreases domestic R&D investment and the growth rate of domestic technology.
Given that economic growth in a country depends on both domestic and foreign tech-
nologies, an increase in the foreign nominal interest rate also decreases economic growth
in the domestic economy. When each government conducts its monetary policy uni-
laterally to maximize the welfare of only domestic households, the Nash-equilibrium
nominal interest rates are generally higher than the optimal nominal interest rates
chosen by cooperative governments who maximize the welfare of both domestic and
foreign households. This di¤erence is caused by a cross-country spillover e¤ect of mon-
etary policy arising from trade in intermediate goods. Under the CIA constraint on
consumption (R&D investment), a larger market power of rms decreases (increases)
the wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal nominal interest rates. We also
calibrate the two-country model to data in the Euro Area and the UK and nd that
the cross-country welfare e¤ects of monetary policy are quantitatively signicant.
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1 Introduction
In this study, we analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth and social welfare
in an open economy. Specically, we develop a two-country version of the Schumpeterian
growth model and introduce money demand into the model via a cash-in-advance (CIA)
constraint on R&D investment in each country.1 Empirical evidence supports the view that
R&D investment is severely a¤ected by liquidity requirements. For example, Hall (1992),
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), Opler et al. (1999) and Brown and Petersen (2009) nd a
positive and signicant relationship between R&D and cash ow in US rms. Recent studies
by Brown and Petersen (2011) and Brown et al. (2012) provide evidence that rms tend
to smooth R&D expenditures by maintaining a bu¤er stock of liquidity in the form of cash
reserves.2 Given these liquidity requirements on R&D investment, the nominal interest rate
that determines the opportunity cost of cash holdings a¤ects R&D investment, economic
growth and social welfare. In an open economy, monetary policy may have spillover e¤ects
across countries through international trade.
The results from our growth-theoretic analysis conrm the above intuition and can be
summarized as follows. An increase in the domestic nominal interest rate decreases domestic
R&D investment and the growth rate of domestic technology. Given that economic growth
in a country depends on the growth rate of domestic technology as well as the growth rate of
foreign technology, an increase in the foreign nominal interest rate also decreases economic
growth in the domestic economy. When each government conducts its monetary policy uni-
laterally to maximize the welfare of only domestic households, the Nash-equilibrium nominal
interest rates are generally di¤erent from the optimal nominal interest rates chosen by coop-
erative governments who maximize the aggregate welfare of domestic and foreign households.
Specically, we nd that under the special case of inelastic labor supply, the Nash-equilibrium
nominal interest rates coincide with the optimal nominal interest rates. However, under the
more general case of elastic labor supply, the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rates are
higher than the optimal nominal interest rates because there exists a cross-country spillover
e¤ect of monetary policy. The intuition of this result can be explained as follows. When the
government in a country reduces the nominal interest rate, the welfare gain from higher eco-
nomic growth is shared by the other country through trade in intermediate goods, whereas
the welfare cost of increasing labor supply falls entirely on domestic households. As a result,
the governments do not lower the nominal interest rates su¢ ciently in the Nash equilibrium.
The Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rates depend on the market power of rms. Under
the CIA constraint on consumption, a larger markup reduces the wedge between the Nash-
equilibrium and optimal nominal interest rates. This nding is consistent with the insight of
Arseneau (2007), who shows that the market power of rms has a dampening e¤ect on the
inationary bias from monetary policy competition in Cooley and Quadrini (2003). However,
under the CIA constraint on R&D investment, we have the opposite result that a larger
markup magnies the inationary bias from monetary policy competition. These di¤erent
implications highlight the importance of the di¤erences between the two CIA constraints.
1See also Chu and Cozzi (2013), who introduce a CIA constraint on R&D investment into a closed-economy
version of the Schumpeterian growth model and analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy.
2See also Berentsen et al. (2012) for a discussion of other empirical studies on the importance of cash
holdings on R&D investment.
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The di¤erence between the CIA constraint on consumption and the CIA constraint on R&D
is that under the latter, an increase in the nominal interest rate leads to a reallocation
of labor from R&D to production. As a result, higher nominal interest rates would be
chosen by the governments in the Nash equilibrium to depress R&D as the negative R&D
externality in the form of a business-stealing e¤ect determined by the markup becomes
stronger. In contrast, under the CIA constraint on consumption, this reallocation e¤ect is
absent because an increase in the nominal interest rate decreases both R&D and production
labors. Given that the economy features an undersupply of labor due to the distortion of
monopolistic competition, the governments would choose lower nominal interest rates in
the Nash equilibrium as this monopolistic distortion determined by the markup becomes
stronger.
We also calibrate the two-country model to aggregate data in the Euro Area and the
United Kingdom (UK). We nd that the cross-country welfare e¤ects of monetary policy
are quantitatively signicant. For example, achieving price stability in the Euro Area would
lead to a welfare gain of 0.287% of consumption per year in the UK in addition to a welfare
gain of 0.979% of consumption per year in the Euro Area. If we consider a larger decrease in
the nominal interest rate in the Euro Area to achieve the Friedman rule (i.e., a zero nominal
interest rate), the welfare gains would be even more signicant at 0.706% of consumption
per year in the UK and 2.447% of consumption per year in the Euro Area. Furthermore,
given a rising volume of trade between the two economies, the cross-country welfare e¤ects
of monetary policy are likely to become even stronger in the future.
This study relates to the literature of ination and economic growth; see Stockman
(1981) and Abel (1985) for seminal studies of the CIA constraint on capital investment in
the Neoclassical growth model. Instead of analyzing the e¤ects of monetary policy in the
Neoclassical growth model, we consider an R&D-based growth model in which economic
growth is driven by innovation and endogenous technological progress. The seminal study in
this literature of ination and innovation-driven growth is Marquis and Re¤ett (1994), who
analyze a CIA constraint on consumption in a Romer variety-expanding model.3 In contrast,
we consider a Schumpeterian quality-ladder model and analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy
via a CIA constraint on R&D investment as in Chu and Cozzi (2013).4 Huang et al. (2013)
also analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy via CIA constraints on R&D investment in a
Schumpeterian model with endogenous market structure. The present study di¤ers from the
closed-economy analyses in Chu and Cozzi (2013) and Huang et al. (2013) by considering
a two-country setting with trade in intermediate goods across countries. To our knowledge,
this is the rst study that analyzes the e¤ects of monetary policy in a growth-theoretic
framework that features R&D-driven innovation in an open economy.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the open-economy
monetary Schumpeterian growth model. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of monetary policy
on economic growth. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ects of monetary policy on social welfare.
Section 5 concludes.
3Chu et al. (2013) provide an analysis of the CIA constraint on consumption in a hybrid growth model
in which economic growth in the long run is driven by both variety expansion and capital accumulation.
4See Chu and Lai (2013) for an analysis of the money-in-utility approach to model money demand in the
quality-ladder growth model.
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2 The model
In this section, we develop an open-economy version of a monetary Schumpeterian growth
model. The underlying quality-ladder model is based on the seminal work of Grossman and
Helpman (1991).5 In summary, we modify the Grossman-Helpman model by introducing
money demand via CIA constraints on consumption and R&D investment as in Chu and
Cozzi (2013) and extending the closed-economy model into a two-country setting with trade
in intermediate goods. The home country is denoted with a superscript h, whereas the
foreign country is denoted with a superscript f . Both countries invest in R&D, but we allow
for asymmetry across the two countries in a number of structural parameters. Following a
common treatment in this type of two-country models, we assume balanced trade. Given
that the quality-ladder model has been well-studied, we will describe the familiar components
briey but discuss the new features in details. Furthermore, to conserve space, we will only
present the equations for the home country h, but the readers are advised to keep in mind
that for each equation that we present, there is an analogous equation for the foreign country
f .
2.1 Households
In each country, there is a representative household. The lifetime utility function of the
household in country h is given by
Uh =
Z 1
0
e t

lnCht + 
h ln(1  Lht )

dt, (1)
where Cht denotes consumption goods in country h at time t. L
h
t denotes the supply of labor
in country h, and labor is assumed to be immobile across countries. The parameters  > 0
and h  0 determine respectively subjective discounting and leisure preference. We allow
for asymmetry in h across the two countries, so that the countries may have di¤erent sizes
of the labor force.
The household maximizes (1) subject to the following asset-accumulation equation:
_V ht + _M
h
t = R
h
t V
h
t +W
h
t L
h
t + T
h
t   P ht Cht +RhtBht . (2)
V ht is the nominal value of nancial assets (in the form of equity shares in monopolistic
rms in country h) owned by the household.6 Rht is the nominal interest rate in country h.
W ht is the nominal wage rate and T
h
t is the nominal value of a lump-sum transfer (or tax
if T ht < 0) from the government to the household. P
h
t is the price of consumption goods in
country h. Mht is the nominal value of domestic currency held by the household partly to
facilitate purchases of consumption goods in country h. The CIA constraint on consumption
goods is given by hP ht C
h
t  Mht   Bht , where h  0 parameterizes the strength of the
5See also Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Segerstrom et al. (1990) for the other seminal studies of the
quality-ladder model.
6Here we assume home bias in asset holding (i.e., domestic monopolistic rms are owned by domestic
households) in order to allow the rates of return on assets to di¤er across countries.
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CIA constraint on consumption in country h. Finally, Bht is the nominal value of domestic
currency borrowed by R&D entrepreneurs to nance their R&D investment, and the rate of
return on Bht is the nominal interest rate R
h
t .
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From standard dynamic optimization, the optimality condition for consumption in coun-
try h is
P ht C
h
t =
1
ht (1 + 
hRht )
, (3)
where ht is the Hamiltonian co-state variable on (2). The optimality condition for labor
supply is
Lht = 1 
hP ht C
h
t (1 + 
hRht )
W ht
. (4)
Finally, the intertemporal optimality condition is
  _
h
t
ht
= Rht   . (5)
In the case of a constant nominal interest rate Rh, (3) and (5) simplify to the familiar Euler
equation _Cht =C
h
t = r
h
t   , where rht = Rh   _P ht =P ht is the real interest rate in country h.
2.2 Consumption goods
Consumption goods in country h are produced by competitive rms that aggregate two types
of nal goods using a Cobb-Douglas aggregator8 given by
Cht =
(Y h;ht )
1 (Y h;ft )

(1  )1  , (6)
where Y h;ft denotes country hs nal goods that are produced with intermediate goods im-
ported from country f , and Y h;ht denotes country hs nal goods that are produced with
domestic intermediate goods. The parameter  2 [0; 1] determines the importance of for-
eign goods in domestic consumption. From prot maximization, the conditional demand
functions for Y h;ht and Y
h;f
t are respectively
Y h;ht = (1  )P ht Cht =P h;ht , (7)
Y h;ft = P
h
t C
h
t =P
h;f
t , (8)
where P h;ht is the price of Y
h;h
t , and P
h;f
t is the price of Y
h;f
t . The familiar price index of
consumption goods in country h is P ht = (P
h;h
t )
1 (P h;ft )
.
7It can be easily shown as a no-arbitrage condition that the rate of return on Bht must be equal to the
nominal interest rate.
8We consider a Cobb-Douglas aggregator instead of a more general CES aggregator in order to allow Y h;ht
and Y h;ft to grow at di¤erent rates on the balanced growth path.
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2.3 Final goods
Final goods Y h;ht and Y
h;f
t are also produced by competitive rms. Competitive rms in
country h produce Y h;ht by aggregating a unit continuum of domestic intermediate goods
Xh;ht (i) for i 2 [0; 1]. The standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator is given by
Y h;ht = exp
Z 1
0
lnXh;ht (i)di

. (9)
Similarly, competitive rms in country h produce Y h;ft by aggregating a unit continuum of
foreign intermediate goods Xh;ft (j) for j 2 [0; 1]. The Cobb-Douglas aggregator is given by
Y h;ft = exp
Z 1
0
lnXh;ft (j)dj

. (10)
From prot maximization, the conditional demand functions for Xh;ht (i) and X
h;f
t (j) are
respectively
Xh;ht (i) = P
h;h
t Y
h;h
t =P
h;h
t (i), (11)
Xh;ft (j) = P
h;f
t Y
h;f
t =P
h;f
t (j), (12)
where P h;ht (i) is the price of X
h;h
t (i), and P
h;f
t (j) is the price of X
h;f
t (j). Finally, the price
index of nal goods Y h;ht is P
h;h
t  exp
R 1
0
lnP h;ht (i)di

, and the price index of nal goods
Y h;ft is P
h;f
t  exp
R 1
0
lnP h;ft (j)dj

. All these prices are denominated in the domestic
currency.
2.4 Intermediate goods
In country h, there is a unit continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods indexed by
i 2 [0; 1]. In each industry i 2 [0; 1], there is an industry leader who dominates the market
temporarily until the arrival of the next innovation.9 The industry leader employs workers in
country h to produce Xh;ht (i) for sales in country h and X
f;h
t (i) for sales in country f .
10 The
industry leaders production of Xh;ht (i) and X
f;h
t (i) uses the same technology except for the
presence of an iceberg transportation cost c 2 (0; 1) for Xf;ht (i). Specically, the production
functions are given by
Xh;ht (i) = (z
h)q
h
t (i)Lh;hx;t (i), (13)
Xf;ht (i) = (1  c)(zh)q
h
t (i)Lf;hx;t (i). (14)
zh > 1 is the step size of innovation in country h, and we allow this parameter to di¤er across
countries. qht (i) is the number of quality improvements that have occurred in industry i as
of time t.11 The total number of production workers employed in industry i of country h is
Lhx;t(i) = L
h;h
x;t (i) + L
f;h
x;t (i).
9This is known as the Arrow replacement e¤ect in the literature. See Cozzi (2007) for a discussion of the
Arrow e¤ect.
10In order to keep the analysis tractable, we do not consider production o¤shoring in this study.
11It is useful to note that we here adopt a cost-reducing view of quality improvement as in Peretto (1998).
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Given (zh)q
h
t (i) in industry i, the leaders marginal cost functions for Xh;ht (i) and X
f;h
t (i)
are respectively
MCh;ht (i) =
W ht
(zh)q
h
t (i)
, (15)
MCf;ht (i) =
W ht
(1  c)(zh)qht (i) . (16)
Standard Bertrand price competition leads to markup pricing. The markup ratio is assumed
to equal the step size zh of innovation in the original Grossman-Helpman model. Here we
allow for variable patent breadth similar to Li (2001) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013)
by assuming that the markup h > 1 is a policy instrument determined by the patent
authority.12 For simplicity, we focus on the case in which h = f = , and this assumption
can be partly justied by the harmonization of patent protection across countries as a result
of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) e¤ective
since 1996.13 Therefore, the price of Xh;ht (i) is
P h;ht (i) = MC
h;h
t (i) = 
W ht
(zh)q
h
t (i)
. (17)
Similarly, the price of Xf;ht (i) denominated in country hs currency is
EtP f;ht (i) = MCf;ht (i) = 
W ht
(1  c)(zh)qht (i) , (18)
where P f;ht (i) is the price of X
f;h
t (i) denominated in country fs currency, and Et denotes the
nominal exchange rate.
Given (17), the amount of monopolistic prot from selling Xh;ht (i) in country h is
!h;ht (i) =

  1


P h;ht (i)X
h;h
t (i) =

  1


P h;ht Y
h;h
t , (19)
where the second equality follows from (11). Similarly, the amount of monopolistic prot
(denominated in country fs currency) from selling Xf;ht (i) in country f is
!f;ht (i) =

  1


P f;ht (i)X
f;h
t (i) =

  1


P f;ht Y
f;h
t , (20)
12To model patent breadth, we rst make a standard assumption in the literature, see for example Howitt
(1999) and Segerstrom (2000), that once the incumbent leaves the market, she cannot threaten to reenter
the market due to a reentry cost. As a result of the incumbent stopping production, the entrant is able to
charge the unconstrained monopolistic markup, which is innity due to the Cobb-Douglas specication in
(9) and (10), under the case of complete patent breadth. However, with incomplete patent breadth, potential
imitation limits the markup. Specically, the presence of monopolistic prots attracts imitation; therefore,
stronger patent protection allows monopolistic producers to charge a higher markup without the threat of
imitation. This formulation of patent breadth captures Gilbert and Shapiros (1990) seminal insight on
"breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise price".
13See Grossman and Lai (2004) for an analysis of the harmonization of patent protection under TRIPS.
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where the second equality follows from country fs analogous condition of (12). Therefore,
the total amount of monopolistic prots (denominated in country hs currency) earned by
the leader in industry i is
!ht (i) = !
h;h
t (i) + Et!f;ht (i) =
  1


P h;ht Y
h;h
t + EtP f;ht Y f;ht

. (21)
Finally, wage income paid to industry is workers in country h is
W ht L
h
x;t(i) = W
h
t L
h;h
x;t (i) +W
h
t L
f;h
x;t (i) =
1


P h;ht Y
h;h
t + EtP f;ht Y f;ht

. (22)
2.5 R&D
Denote V ht (i) as the nominal value of the monopolistic rm in industry i 2 [0; 1] of country
h. Because !ht (i) = !
h
t for i 2 [0; 1] from (21), V ht (i) = V ht in a symmetric equilibrium that
features an equal arrival rate of innovation across industries within a country.14 In this case,
the familiar no-arbitrage condition for V ht is
Rht =
!ht +
_V ht   ht V ht
V ht
. (23)
This condition equates the nominal interest rate Rht in country h to the rate of return per
unit of domestic asset. The asset return is the sum of (a) monopolistic prot !ht , (b) potential
capital gain _V ht , and (c) expected capital loss 
h
t V
h
t due to creative destruction, where 
h
t is
the arrival rate of the next innovation in country h.
There is a unit continuum of R&D entrepreneurs indexed by k 2 [0; 1] in each country,
and they hire R&D labor for innovation. In country h, entrepreneur ks wage payment to
R&D labor is W ht L
h
r;t(k). However, to facilitate this wage payment, the entrepreneur needs
to borrow Bht (k) = W
h
t L
h
r;t(k) units of domestic currency from the domestic household.
Following Chu and Cozzi (2013), we impose a CIA constraint on R&D investment, and the
cost of borrowing is RhtB
h
t (k). Therefore, the total cost of R&D is (1 + R
h
t )W
h
t L
h
r;t(k). Free
entry implies zero expected prot such that
V ht 
h
t (k) = (1 +R
h
t )W
h
t L
h
r;t(k), (24)
where the rm-level arrival rate of innovation is ht (k) = '
hLhr;t(k), and we allow the R&D
productivity parameter 'h to di¤er across countries. Finally, the aggregate arrival rate of
innovation in country h is
ht =
Z 1
0
ht (k)dk = '
hLhr;t. (25)
14We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium. See Cozzi et
al. (2007) for a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium to be the unique rational-expectation
equilibrium in the Schumpeterian growth model.
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2.6 Monetary authority
The growth rate of the nominal money supply in country h is _Mht =M
h
t . By denition, the
real money balance in country h is mht = M
h
t =P
h
t , where P
h
t is the price of consumption
goods in country h. Therefore, the growth rate of mht is _m
h
t =m
h
t = _M
h
t =M
h
t   ht , where
ht  _P ht =P ht is the ination rate of the price of consumption goods in country h. The
policy instrument that we consider is the nominal interest rate Rht , which is exogenously
chosen by the monetary authority in country h. Given Rht , the ination rate in country h
is endogenously determined according to the Fisher identity ht = R
h
t   rht where rht is the
real interest rate in country h, and then the growth rate of the nominal money supply Mht
in country h is endogenously determined according to _Mht =M
h
t = _m
h
t =m
h
t + 
h
t . Finally, the
monetary authority in country h returns the seigniorage revenue as a lump-sum transfer
T ht = _M
h
t to the domestic household.
2.7 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fLht ; Lft ; Cht ; Cft ; Y h;ht ; Y h;ft ; Y f;ft ; Y f;ht ; Xh;ht (i);
Xh;ft (j); X
f;f
t (j); X
f;h
t (i); L
h
x;t(i); L
f
x;t(j); L
h
r;t(k); L
f
r;t(k)g1t=0, a time path of prices fW ht ;W ft ; P ht ;
P ft ; P
h;h
t ; P
h;f
t ; P
f;f
t ; P
f;h
t ; P
h;h
t (i); P
h;f
t (j); P
f;f
t (j); P
f;h
t (i); V
h
t ; V
f
t ; Etg1t=0 and a time path of
monetary policies fRht ; Rft g1t=0. Also, at each instance of time,
 the representative household in country hmaximizes lifetime utility taking fRht ;W ht ; P ht g
as given;
 the representative household in country f maximizes lifetime utility taking fRft ;W ft ; P ft g
as given;
 competitive consumption-good rms in country h produce fCht g to maximize prot
taking fP ht ; P h;ht ; P h;ft g as given;
 competitive consumption-good rms in country f produce fCft g to maximize prot
taking fP ft ; P f;ft ; P f;ht g as given;
 competitive nal-good rms in country h produce fY h;ht ; Y h;ft g to maximize prot tak-
ing fP h;ht ; P h;ft ; P h;ht (i); P h;ft (j)g as given;
 competitive nal-good rms in country f produce fY f;ft ; Y f;ht g to maximize prot tak-
ing fP f;ft ; P f;ht ; P f;ft (j); P f;ht (i)g as given;
 monopolistic intermediate-good rm i 2 [0; 1] in country h produces fXh;ht (i); Xf;ht (i)g
and chooses fP h;ht (i); P f;ht (i)g to maximize prot taking fW ht g as given;
 monopolistic intermediate-good rm j 2 [0; 1] in country f produces fXf;ft (j); Xh;ft (j)g
and chooses fP f;ft (j); P h;ft (j)g to maximize prot taking fW ft g as given;
 competitive R&D entrepreneurs k 2 [0; 1] in country h employ fLhr;t(k)g to maximize
expected prot taking fRht ;W ht ; V ht g as given;
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 competitive R&D entrepreneurs k 2 [0; 1] in country f employ fLfr;t(k)g to maximize
expected prot taking fRft ;W ft ; V ft g as given;
 the market-clearing condition for labor holds in both countries such that Lhx;t+Lhr;t = Lht
and Lfx;t + L
f
r;t = L
f
t ; and
 the value of trade in intermediate goods is balanced such that R 1
0
P h;ft (j)X
h;f
t (j)dj =
Et
R 1
0
P f;ht (i)X
f;h
t (i)di.
2.8 Aggregate economy
Substituting (13) into (9) yields the aggregate production function for nal goods Y h;ht given
by
Y h;ht = Z
h
t L
h;h
x;t , (26)
where aggregate technology Zht in country h is dened as
Zht  exp
Z 1
0
qht (i)di ln z
h

= exp
Z t
0
hd ln z
h

. (27)
The second equality of (27) applies the law of large numbers. Di¤erentiating the log of (27)
with respect to t yields the growth rate of aggregate technology in country h given by
_Zht
Zht
= ht ln z
h = ('h ln zh)Lhr;t. (28)
Similarly, substituting country fs analogous condition of (14) into (10) yields the aggregate
production function for nal goods Y h;ft given by
Y h;ft = (1  c)Zft Lh;fx;t , (29)
where aggregate technology Zft in country f is dened as
Zft  exp
Z 1
0
qft (j)dj ln z
f

= exp
Z t
0
fd ln z
f

. (30)
Di¤erentiating the log of (30) with respect to t yields the growth rate of aggregate technology
in country f given by
_Zft
Zft
= ft ln z
f = ('f ln zf )Lfr;t. (31)
As for the dynamics of the model, Proposition 1 shows that the economy jumps to a
unique and saddle-point stable balanced growth path (BGP). On the BGP, the allocations
of labor in both countries are stationary. Therefore, taking the log of (6) and di¤erentiating
it with respect to t yields the balanced growth rate of consumption goods Cht in country h
given by
_Cht
Cht
= (1 )
_Y h;ht
Y h;ht
+
_Y h;ft
Y h;ft
= (1 )
_Zht
Zht
+
_Zft
Zft
= (1 )('h ln zh)Lhr +('f ln zf )Lfr . (32)
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Proposition 1 Given constant nominal interest rates fRh; Rfg in the two countries, the
economy immediately jumps to a unique and saddle-point stable balanced growth path along
which each variable grows at a constant (possibly zero) rate.
Proof. See Appendix A.
2.9 Equilibrium labor allocations
In this subsection, we sketch out the derivations of the equilibrium labor allocations in
country h and relegate the detailed proof to Appendix A. From (24), the free-entry condition
in the R&D sector becomes 'hV ht = (1 + R
h)W ht , where the value of an innovation is
V ht = !
h
t =( + 
h) = !ht =( + '
hLhr ) on the BGP as implied by (23) and (25). Then,
substituting !ht from (21) and W
h
t from (22) into the R&D free-entry condition, we derive
the following equilibrium relationship between Lhr and L
h
x:
Lhr =
  1
1 +Rh
Lhx  

'h
. (33)
The second condition is the households labor supply function in (4), which can be reex-
pressed as
Lh = 1  h(1 + hRh)Lhx. (34)
The third condition for solving the equilibrium labor allocations is the resource constraint
on labor given by
Lhx + L
h
r = L
h, (35)
where Lhx = L
h;h
x +L
f;h
x . Finally, we combine the conditional demand functions in (7) and (8)
with (22) and the balanced-trade condition that can be reexpressed as P h;ft Y
h;f
t = EtP f;ht Y f;ht
to solve for the following equilibrium relationship between Lh;hx and L
f;h
x :
Lf;hx =

1  L
h;h
x . (36)
Solving (33)-(36), we derive the equilibrium labor allocations in country h.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium labor allocations in country h are given by
Lhr =
  1
+Rh + h(1 + hRh)(1 +Rh)

1 +

'h

  
'h
, (37)
Lh;hx = (1  )Lhx =
(1  )(1 +Rh)
+Rh + h(1 + hRh)(1 +Rh)

1 +

'h

, (38)
Lf;hx = L
h
x =
(1 +Rh)
+Rh + h(1 + hRh)(1 +Rh)

1 +

'h

, (39)
Lh = 1  
h(1 + hRh)(1 +Rh)
+Rh + h(1 + hRh)(1 +Rh)

1 +

'h

. (40)
Proof. See Appendix A.
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3 E¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of the domestic and foreign nominal interest rates on
economic growth. Equation (37) shows that R&D labor Lhr is decreasing in the domestic
nominal interest rate Rh through the CIA constraints on R&D investment and consumption.
Given the CIA constraint on R&D investment, an increase in the domestic nominal interest
rate Rh increases the nancing cost of R&D, and hence, it has a direct negative e¤ect on R&D
labor Lhr . This nancing-cost channel via the CIA constraint on R&D investment is present
regardless of whether labor supply is elastic (i.e., h > 0) or inelastic (i.e., h = 0). Under the
CIA constraint on consumption, the negative e¤ect of the domestic nominal interest rate Rh
on R&D operates through elastic labor supply. Equation (40) shows that labor supply Lh is
decreasing in the nominal interest rate Rh partly due to the CIA constraint on consumption
(i.e., h > 0). In other words, an increase in the domestic nominal interest rate raises the
cost of consumption and causes the household to increase leisure. The resulting decrease
in labor supply Lh in turn reduces R&D labor Lhr . This labor-supply channel via the CIA
constraint on consumption is present only if labor supply is elastic (i.e., h > 0). Given
that R&D labor Lhr is decreasing in the domestic nominal interest rate, the growth rate of
technology in country h is also decreasing in the domestic nominal interest rate Rh; in other
words,
@ _Zht =Z
h
t
@Rh
= ('h ln zh)
@Lhr
@Rh
< 0. (41)
Equation (37) also shows that R&D labor is independent of the foreign nominal interest
rate Rf . Therefore, the growth rate of technology in country h must be also independent of
Rf ; in other words,
@ _Zht =Z
h
t
@Rf
= ('h ln zh)
@Lhr
@Rf
= 0. (42)
Nevertheless, economic growth in country h (i.e., the growth rate of consumption goods) is
decreasing in the foreign nominal interest rate Rf . To see this result, we rst write down
country fs analogous expression of (37) for the equilibrium allocation of R&D labor Lfr
given by
Lfr =
  1
+Rf + f (1 + fRf )(1 +Rf )

1 +

'f

  
'f
, (43)
which is decreasing in the foreign nominal interest rate Rf . Therefore, the growth rate of
consumption goods in country h is decreasing in the foreign nominal interest rate Rf through
the growth rate of foreign technology; in other words,
@gh
@Rf
= (1  )('h ln zh)@L
h
r
@Rf
+ ('f ln zf )
@Lfr
@Rf
= ('f ln zf )
@Lfr
@Rf
< 0, (44)
where gh  _Cht =Cht . The growth rate of consumption goods in country h is also decreasing
in the domestic nominal interest rate Rh through the growth rate of domestic technology; in
other words,
@gh
@Rh
= (1  )('h ln zh)@L
h
r
@Rh
+ ('f ln zf )
@Lfr
@Rh
= (1  )('h ln zh)@L
h
r
@Rh
< 0. (45)
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As foreign goods become more important in domestic consumption (i.e., a larger ), the
negative growth e¤ect of the foreign nominal interest rate becomes stronger, whereas the
negative growth e¤ect of the domestic nominal interest rate becomes weaker. Proposition 3
summarizes the above results.
Proposition 3 The growth rate of domestic technology is decreasing in the domestic nominal
interest rate but independent of the foreign nominal interest rate. The growth rate of foreign
technology is decreasing in the foreign nominal interest rate but independent of the domestic
nominal interest rate. The growth rate of domestic consumption is decreasing in both the
domestic and foreign nominal interest rates. The relative magnitude of these negative growth
e¤ects of the domestic and foreign nominal interest rates depends on  (i.e., the importance
of foreign goods in domestic consumption).
Proof. Proven in text.
Using the Fisher identity h = Rh  rh and the Euler equation rh = gh + , we can write
down an expression for the equilibrium ination rate given by h = Rh   gh(Rh)  , where
gh is decreasing in the nominal interest rate Rh. Therefore, di¤erentiating h with respect
to Rh yields
@h
@Rh
= 1  @g
h
@Rh
> 0.
Together with Proposition 3, we have the following empirical implications. First, an increase
in the nominal interest rate leads to an increase in the ination rate and a decrease in R&D
investment. This nding is consistent with the empirical evidence in Chu and Lai (2013),
who document a negative relationship between ination and R&D using cross-country data.
Second, an increase in the nominal interest rate leads to an increase in the ination rate and
a decrease in the growth rate of technology. This nding is consistent with the empirical
results in Bruno and Easterly (1998) and Evers et al. (2007), who provide evidence for
a negative relationship between ination and the growth rate of total factor productivity.
Finally, an increase in the nominal interest rate leads to an increase in the ination rate and
a decrease in the growth rate of output. This negative relationship between ination and
economic growth is supported by the empirical results in Vaona (2012).
4 E¤ects of monetary policy on social welfare
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of the domestic and foreign nominal interest rates on
social welfare. Given the balanced-growth behavior of the economy, the lifetime utility of
the representative household in country h simplies to
Uh =
1


lnCh0 +
gh

+ h ln(1  Lh)

. (46)
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Substituting (6), (26), (29) and (32) into (46) and then dropping the exogenous terms (in-
cluding Zh0 and Z
f
0 ) yield
Uh = (1 ) lnLh;hx + lnLh;fx +
(1  )('h ln zh)

Lhr +
('f ln zf )

Lfr + 
h ln(1 Lh). (47)
The analogous condition of (39) in country f implies that Lh;fx is given by
Lh;fx =
(1 +Rf )
+Rf + f (1 + fRf )(1 +Rf )

1 +

'f

, (48)
which depends on the foreign nominal interest rate Rf . In summary, the set of variables
fLh;hx ; Lhr ; Lhg in (47) depends on the domestic nominal interest rate Rh, whereas the set of
variables fLh;fx ; Lfrg depends on the foreign nominal interest rate Rf .
In the following subsections, we will derive (a) the nominal interest rate that is unilaterally
chosen by each government to maximize domestic welfare and (b) the nominal interest rates
that are chosen by cooperative governments who maximize the aggregate welfare of the two
countries. Given that the results di¤er under the following three scenarios, we analyze them
separately. In Section 4.1, we consider the case of inelastic labor supply. In Section 4.2, we
consider elastic labor supply with only the CIA constraint on R&D investment. In Section
4.3, we consider elastic labor supply with only the CIA constraint on consumption.
4.1 Inelastic labor supply
In this subsection, we consider the case of inelastic labor supply (i.e., h = f = 0). In this
case, (37), (38), (43) and (48) simplify to
Lhr =
  1
+Rh

1 +

'h

  
'h
, (49)
Lh;hx =
(1  )(1 +Rh)
+Rh

1 +

'h

, (50)
Lfr =
  1
+Rf

1 +

'f

  
'f
, (51)
Lh;fx =
(1 +Rf )
+Rf

1 +

'f

, (52)
and Lh = 1. Due to inelastic labor supply, the e¤ect of the nominal interest rate operates
solely through the CIA constraint on R&D investment. Substituting (49)-(52) into (47) and
then di¤erentiating Uh with respect to Rh, we obtain the following domestic nominal interest
rate that is unilaterally chosen by the government in country h to maximize the domestic
households welfare:
Rhne = max

  
h

h   1 ; 0

, (53)
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where 
h  (1 + 'h=) ln zh > 1.15 Equation (53) also takes into account the zero lower
bound on the nominal interest rate, which would be binding if 
h > . The analogous foreign
nominal interest rate that is unilaterally chosen by country fs government to maximize the
welfare of the household in country f is given by
Rfne = max

  
f

f   1 ; 0

, (54)
where 
f  (1 + 'f=) ln zf > 1.16 The comparative statics are quite intuitive. Recall that
domestic R&D investment is decreasing in the domestic nominal interest rate. Therefore,
a larger innovation step size zh (zf) would decrease the nominal interest rate Rhne (R
f
ne)
because R&D has a larger social benet in this case. Similarly, a higher R&D productivity
'h ('f) would also decrease Rhne (R
f
ne) for the same reason. In contrast, a higher discount
rate  would increase Rhne and R
f
ne because R&D that leads to economic growth has a smaller
social benet when households discount future consumption more heavily.
We refer to the pair fRhne; Rfneg as the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rates because
each government pursues its own objective taking the other governments action as given.
An interesting observation is that Rfne is also the foreign nominal interest rate that would
be preferred by the government in country h. To see this result, we di¤erentiate Uh with
respect to Rf and nd that the optimal foreign nominal interest rate for country h is also Rfne.
Finally, we consider cooperative governments who choose fRh; Rfg to maximize aggregate
welfare dened as Uh+U f , and we refer to these nominal interest rates as the optimal nominal
interest rates denoted as fRh ; Rfg. We nd that fRh ; Rfg = fRhne; Rfneg; in other words,
the unilateral action of each government gives rise to an internationally optimal outcome;
however, in the next subsection, we will show that this special result is due to the restriction
of inelastic labor supply. We summarize the above results in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Under inelastic labor supply, the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rate uni-
laterally chosen by each government coincides with the optimal nominal interest rate chosen
by cooperative governments who maximize aggregate welfare of the two countries. The opti-
mal nominal interest rate in each country is decreasing in the domestic step size of innovation
and domestic R&D productivity but increasing in the discount rate.
Proof. See Appendix A.
4.2 Elastic labor supply with CIA on R&D only
In this subsection, we consider the case of elastic labor supply with the CIA constraint on
R&D. However, we remove the CIA constraint on consumption by setting h = f = 0. In
15In an unpublished appendix (see Appendix B), we derive the rst-best allocation of R&D labor in country
h and show that the parameter restriction on this optimal R&D labor to be positive also implies 
h > 1.
16We show in an unpublished appendix (see Appendix B) that this parameter restriction holds for a similar
reason as 
h > 1.
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this case, (37), (38), (40), (43) and (48) simplify to
Lhr =
  1
+Rh + h(1 +Rh)

1 +

'h

  
'h
, (55)
Lh;hx =
(1  )(1 +Rh)
+Rh + h(1 +Rh)

1 +

'h

, (56)
Lh = 1  
h(1 +Rh)
+Rh + h(1 +Rh)

1 +

'h

, (57)
Lfr =
  1
+Rf + f (1 +Rf )

1 +

'f

  
'f
, (58)
Lh;fx =
(1 +Rf )
+Rf + f (1 +Rf )

1 +

'f

. (59)
Substituting these conditions into (47) and then di¤erentiating Uh with respect to Rh, we
obtain the following domestic nominal interest rate that is unilaterally chosen by the gov-
ernment in country h to maximize the domestic households welfare:
Rhne = max

  h
h   1 ; 0

, (60)
where17
h  1  
1   + h

1 +
'h


(1 + h) ln zh   h > 1.
The analogous foreign nominal interest rate that is unilaterally chosen by country fs gov-
ernment to maximize the welfare of the household in country f is given by
Rfne = max

  f
f   1 ; 0

, (61)
where18
f  1  
1   + f

1 +
'f


(1 + f ) ln zf   f > 1.
We also consider cooperative governments who choose fRh; Rfg to maximize aggregate wel-
fare Uh + U f , and these optimal nominal interest rates are given by
Rh = max

 	h
	h   1 ; 0

, (62)
Rf = max

 	f
	f   1 ; 0

, (63)
17In an unpublished appendix (see Appendix B), we derive the condition under which this parameter
restriction holds.
18In an unpublished appendix (see Appendix B), we derive the condition under which this parameter
restriction holds.
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where19
	h  1
1 + h

1 +
'h


(1 + h) ln zh   h > 1,
	f  1
1 + f

1 +
'f


(1 + f ) ln zf   f > 1.
We see that 	h > h and 	f > f because  > 0; therefore, Rh < R
h
ne and R
f
 < R
f
ne.
In other words, the unilateral action of each government leads to excessively high nominal
interest rates in the Nash equilibrium due to a cross-country spillover e¤ect of monetary
policy under elastic labor supply, and the degree of this cross-country spillover e¤ect is
measured by  (i.e., the importance of foreign goods in domestic consumption). Intuitively,
when a country lowers its nominal interest rate, the welfare gain from higher economic growth
is shared by the other country, whereas the welfare cost of increasing labor supply (Lh in (57)
is decreasing in Rh) falls entirely on the domestic household. As a result, the government
does not lower the domestic nominal interest rate su¢ ciently in the Nash equilibrium; in
contrast, cooperative governments would internalize the welfare gain from a higher growth
rate in the other country. We summarize these results in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Under elastic labor supply with only a CIA constraint on R&D, the Nash-
equilibrium nominal interest rate unilaterally chosen by each government is higher than the
optimal nominal interest rate chosen by cooperative governments who maximize aggregate
welfare of the two countries. The Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rates are increasing in
, whereas the optimal nominal interest rates are independent of .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Substituting h into Rhne in (60), we nd that R
h
ne is increasing in the markup . Sim-
ilarly, substituting 	h into Rh in (62), we nd that R
h
 is also increasing in the markup .
Intuitively, a larger markup strengthens the negative R&D externality, commonly known as
the business-stealing e¤ect, in the Schumpeterian growth model. As a result of this stronger
negative R&D externality, the government would raise the nominal interest rate to decrease
the equilibrium allocation of R&D labor. Taking the di¤erence between Rhne and R
h
 and
di¤erentiating it with respect to , we nd that
@(Rhne  Rh)
@
=
1 + h
(1 + h)2
24 1
1 
1 +h

1 + '
h


ln zh   1
  1
1
1+h

1 + '
h


ln zh   1
35 > 0.
In other words, the wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal nominal interest rates
is monotonically increasing in the market power of rms. This result di¤ers from Arseneau
(2007), who shows that a larger market power of rms tends to reduce the wedge between
19In an unpublished appendix (see Appendix B), we derive the rst-best allocations of R&D labor in
countries h and f and show that the parameter restrictions on these optimal R&D labors to be positive also
imply 	h > 1 and 	f > 1.
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the Nash-equilibrium and optimal nominal interest rates. The di¤erent implications between
the two studies are due to the di¤erent CIA constraints. We have analyzed a CIA constraint
on R&D investment, whereas Arseneau (2007) analyzes a CIA constraint on consumption.
In the next subsection, we show that our model also delivers the insight of Arseneau (2007)
under a CIA constraint on consumption, and we will explain the di¤erence between the two
CIA constraints then.
4.3 Elastic labor supply with CIA on consumption only
In this subsection, we consider the case of elastic labor supply with the CIA constraint on
consumption. However, we remove the CIA constraint on R&D. In this case, (33) becomes
Lhr = (  1)Lhx  

'h
. (64)
Solving (34), (35), (36) and (64) yields the equilibrium labor allocations in country h, and
we can follow the same procedure to solve for the equilibrium allocations in country f . In
this case, the equilibrium allocations of fLhr ; Lh;hx ; Lh; Lfr ; Lh;fx g are given by
Lhr =
(  1)=
1 + h(1 + hRh)

1 +

'h

  
'h
, (65)
Lh;hx =
(1  )=
1 + h(1 + hRh)

1 +

'h

, (66)
Lh = 1  
h(1 + hRh)
1 + h(1 + hRh)

1 +

'h

, (67)
Lfr =
(  1)=
1 + f (1 + fRf )

1 +

'f

  
'f
, (68)
Lh;fx =
=
1 + f (1 + fRf )

1 +

'f

. (69)
Substituting (65)-(69) into Uh in (47) and the analogous conditions in country f into U f ,
we nd that the cooperative governmentsoptimization problem yields
@(Uh + U f )
@Rh
< 0
for all values of Rh  0. Therefore, the optimal nominal interest rates are fRh ; Rfg =
f0; 0g implying that the Friedman rule20 is always optimal under the CIA constraint on
consumption.
As for the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rate, we di¤erentiate Uh with respect to Rh
and nd that
@Uh
@Rh
=  
hh (1  )  1 + ='h


1 + h
 
1 + hRh
2
"
(1  )  1 + hRh  1
Lh;hx
 
1 + hRh
 + (  1)'h

ln zh
#
, (70)
20In his seminal study, Friedman (1969) argues that the optimal nominal interest rate is zero.
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where Lh;hx is given by (66). Suppose  ! 1. In this case, @Uh=@Rh > 0 when Rh = 0.
In other words, the government has incentives to choose a strictly positive nominal interest
rate. This e¤ect captures the important result of an inationary bias due to monetary policy
competition in Cooley and Quadrini (2003). Equation (70) also shows that a larger markup 
would reduce this inationary bias capturing the dampening e¤ect of monopolistic distortion
raised by Arseneau (2007). If the markup  becomes su¢ ciently large, then @Uh=@Rh < 0
for all values of Rh  0. In this case, the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rate would be
also zero. We summarize these results in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 Under elastic labor supply with only a CIA constraint on consumption, the
optimal nominal interest rates are always zero. If the markup  ! 1, then the Nash-
equilibrium nominal interest rate in country h is Rhne = =[
h (1  )] > 0, which is increas-
ing in . As the markup  increases, the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rates decrease.
If the markup  is su¢ ciently large, then the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rates would
also be zero.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 6 together with the analysis in the previous subsection show that the market
power of rms has very di¤erent implications on the inationary bias from monetary policy
competition. The di¤erence between the CIA constraint on consumption and the CIA con-
straint on R&D is that under the latter, an increase in the nominal interest rate leads to a
reallocation of labor from R&D to production. As a result, a positive nominal interest rate
would be chosen by the government if the business-stealing e¤ect measured by the markup
 is strong. In contrast, under the CIA constraint on consumption, this reallocation e¤ect is
absent because an increase in the nominal interest rate decreases both R&D and production
labors. Given that the economy features an undersupply of labor due to the distortion of
monopolistic competition, the government would avoid setting too high a nominal interest
rate that worsens this monopolistic distortion.
4.4 Quantitative analysis
In this subsection, we provide a numerical illustration on the growth and welfare e¤ects of
monetary policy across countries. We consider the general case with elastic labor supply and
both CIA constraints on R&D and consumption. We calibrate the model using aggregate
data from 1999 to 200721 in the Euro Area and the UK, which are two relatively open
economies. To x notation, we consider the UK as the home country h and the Euro Area as
the foreign country f . To make this quantitative analysis more realistic, we introduce R&D
subsidies fsh; sfg into the model.22 In this case, the free-entry condition of the R&D sector
in country h becomes V ht 
h
t = (1  sh)(1 + Rh)W ht Lhr;t. The R&D subsidies in each country
are nanced by a distortionary labor-income tax subject to a balanced-budget condition
21We do not include data from 2008 onwards due to the international nancial and debt crises.
22Setting fsh; sfg = f0; 0g would strengthen our numerical results.
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given by sh(1 + Rh)W ht L
h
r;t = 
hW ht L
h
t ,
23 where h is the labor-income tax rate in country
h.24
The two-country model features the following set of parameters f; ; ; sh; sf ; zh; zf ; 'h;
'f ; h; f ; h; f ; Rh; Rfg. Given the calibrated parameter values, we then perform a coun-
terfactual policy experiment on the e¤ects of decreasing the nominal interest rate Rf in the
Euro Area on economic growth and social welfare in the two economies. The average value
of imports from the Euro Area to the UK as a percentage of GDP in the UK is 14.9%,25
and we use this empirical moment to calibrate the parameter . As for the discount rate,
we consider a standard value of  = 0:03. As for the markup, we consider a conservative
value of  = 1:03, which is slightly less than the lower-bound value of empirical estimates
reported in Jones and Williams (2000).26 Before 2008, the e¤ective rate of R&D subsidies
in the UK was about 15%.27 The e¤ective rates of R&D subsidies vary substantially across
countries in the Euro Area,28 so we also consider 15% for the rate of R&D subsidies sf in
the foreign economy. The average growth rates of total factor productivity in the UK and
the Euro Area are respectively 0.9% and 0.8%,29 and we use these values to calibrate the
step-size parameters fzh; zfg. The average value of R&D expenditures as a percentage of
GDP in the UK and the Euro Area are respectively 1.8% and 1.9%,30 and we use these val-
ues to calibrate the R&D productivity parameters f'h; 'fg. As for the leisure parameters
fh; fg, we calibrate them by setting the supply of labor fLh; Lfg to a standard value of
0.33. The ratios of M1 to GDP in the UK and the Euro Area are respectively 0.541 and
0.361,31 and we use these values to calibrate the consumption-CIA parameters fh; fg. The
average ination rates in the UK and the Euro Area are respectively 2.1% and 2.8%,32 and
we use these values to calibrate fRh; Rfg. We report the parameter values in Table 1.
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
   sh sf zh zf 'h 'f h f h f Rh Rf
0:149 1:03 0:03 0:15 0:15 1:20 1:15 7:29 8:07 1:95 1:97 0:52 0:34 0:060 0:066
The policy experiments are as follows. We lower the nominal interest rate Rf in the Euro
Area and examine its e¤ects on economic growth fgh; gfg and social welfare fUh; U fg in
the two economies. We consider two policy objectives. First, we lower Rf to achieve price
stability (i.e., a zero ination rate) in the Euro Area. Second, we lower Rf to achieve the
23We do not consider the seigniorage revenue as a source of nancing for R&D subsidies because the
European Central Bank is banned from printing money to nance government expenditures.
24We present the equilibrium conditions in an unpublished appendix (see Appendix C).
25Data source: The OECD Database.
26Considering a larger markup would increase the welfare gains from lowering the nominal interest rate.
27Before 2008, rms can reduce their taxable income by 150% of their R&D expenditures. Given a
corporate tax rate of 30% at that time, the government was e¤ectively providing an R&D subsidy of 15%.
28For example, Warda (2009) provide data on the R&D subsidy rates in OECD countries in 2008. The
subsidy rates in Spain and France were 35% and over 40% respectively, whereas the subsidy rates in Italy
and Germany were respectively 12% and close to 0%.
29Data source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database.
30Data source: Eurostat (European Commission).
31Data source: Bank of England Statistics Database and ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.
32Data source: The OECD Database.
20
Friedman rule (i.e., a zero nominal interest rate) in the Euro Area. We report the numerical
results in Table 233 for our benchmark value of  = 0:149 as well as two other values of 
to be discussed below. Under our benchmark value of  = 0:149, a decrease in the nominal
interest rate Rf to achieve price stability in the Euro Area leads to a welfare gain of 0.979%
of consumption per year in the Euro Area and a welfare gain of 0.287% of consumption per
year in the UK, which is a nonnegligible cross-country welfare e¤ect of monetary policy. If
we consider a larger reduction in the nominal interest rate Rf to achieve the Friedman rule
(i.e., decreasing the nominal interest rate from 6.6% to 0%) in the Euro Area, the welfare
gains are even more signicant at 2.447% of consumption in the Euro Area and 0.706% of
consumption in the UK. The magnitude of this cross-country welfare e¤ect is increasing in
the importance of foreign goods in domestic consumption (i.e., the value of ), which in
turn determines the volume of trade between the two economies. In the data, the volume
of trade between the UK and the Euro Area has been rising. The value of imports from
the Euro Area as a percentage of GDP in the UK rises from 14.2% in 1999 to 17.9% in
2007. We vary  to match these values while holding other parameter values constant. At
the value of  = 0:142 in 1999, the cross-country welfare e¤ect of decreasing the nominal
interest rate to achieve the Friedman rule is 0.673% of consumption in the UK. At the value
of  = 0:179 in 2007, the cross-country welfare e¤ect increases to 0.849% of consumption in
the UK. Therefore, given increasing trade between the two economies, we conjecture that
the cross-country welfare e¤ects of monetary policy will become even stronger in the future.
Table 2: Growth and welfare e¤ects of Rf
 0:142 0:149 0:179  0:142 0:149 0:179
Price stability Friedman rule
gh 0:005% 0:006% 0:007% gh 0:014% 0:015% 0:018%
gf 0:035% 0:034% 0:033% gf 0:086% 0:085% 0:082%
Uh 0:273% 0:287% 0:344% Uh 0:673% 0:706% 0:849%
U f 0:992% 0:979% 0:920% U f 2:481% 2:447% 2:302%
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed the growth and welfare e¤ects of monetary policy in an open-
economy version of the Schumpeterian growth model with CIA constraints on consumption
and R&D investment. We nd that economic growth and social welfare in the domestic
economy are a¤ected by both domestic and foreign monetary policies. Furthermore, the
cross-country welfare e¤ects of monetary policy are quantitatively signicant and strength-
ening overtime due to the rising importance of international trade. Our analysis is based
on a rst-generation R&D-based growth model that features the scale e¤ect, under which a
growing population leads to a rising growth rate.34 We could allow for population growth
33Changes in the growth rate are expressed as changes in percentage points. Welfare gains are expressed
as the usual equivalent variation in consumption.
34See Jones (1999) and Laincz and Peretto (2006) for a discussion of the scale e¤ect in R&D-based growth
models.
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and remove the scale e¤ect by introducing a dilution e¤ect as in Chu and Cozzi (2013), and
our results would be robust to this modication. Nevertheless, it could be fruitful to explore
the e¤ects of monetary policy in other vintages of the Schumpeterian growth model, such as
the semi-endogenous growth version of the Schumpeterian model in Segerstrom (1998) and
the second-generation Schumpeterian growth model in Peretto (1998) and Howitt (1999).
We leave these interesting extensions to future research.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Taking the log of the free-entry condition 'hV ht = (1 + R
h)W ht
in the R&D sector and then di¤erentiating it with respect to t yield
_V ht
V ht
=
_W ht
W ht
. (A1)
Substituting (23) and then (5) into (A1) yields
  _
h
t
ht
+ ht  
!ht
V ht
=
_W ht
W ht
, (A2)
where ht = '
hLhr;t from (25). Taking the log of (3) and di¤erentiating with respect to t yield
  _
h
t
ht
=
_P ht
P ht
+
_Cht
Cht
. (A3)
Substituting the balanced-trade condition P h;ft Y
h;f
t = EtP f;ht Y f;ht into (21) and (22) yields
!ht =
  1


P h;ht Y
h;h
t + P
h;f
t Y
h;f
t

=
  1

P ht C
h
t , (A4)
W ht L
h
x;t =
1


P h;ht Y
h;h
t + P
h;f
t Y
h;f
t

=
1

P ht C
h
t , (A5)
where the second equality of (A4) and (A5) applies (7) and (8). Taking the log of (A5) and
di¤erentiating it with respect to t yield
_W ht
W ht
=
_P ht
P ht
+
_Cht
Cht
 
_Lhx;t
Lhx;t
. (A6)
Substituting (A3) and (A6) into (A2) and then rearranging terms yield
_Lhx;t
Lhx;t
=
!ht
V ht
  'hLhr;t   . (A7)
Substituting 'hV ht = (1 +R
h)W ht , (A4) and (A5) into (A7) yields
1
'h
_Lhx;t
Lhx;t
=
  1
1 +Rh
Lhx;t   Lhr;t  

'h
, (A8)
where Lhr;t = L
h
t   Lhx;t from the resource constraint. Substituting (A5) into (4) yields
Lht = 1  h(1 + hRh)Lhx;t. (A9)
Substituting (A9) into the resource constraint on labor yields
Lhr;t = 1  h(1 + hRh)Lhx;t   Lhx;t. (A10)
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Substituting (A10) into (A8) and then rearranging terms yield
1
'h
_Lhx;t
Lhx;t
=

+Rh
1 +Rh
+ h(1 + hRh)

Lhx;t  

1 +

'h

, (A11)
which is a one-dimensional di¤erential equation in Lhx;t. It is easy to see that the dynamics
of Lhx;t is characterized by saddle-point stability such that L
h
x;t must jump to its interior
steady-state value, which in turn implies that Lht and L
h
r;t also jump to their steady-state
values according to (A9) and (A10). An analogous proof would show that labor allocations
in country f also jump to their steady-state values.
Proof of Proposition 2. Setting _Lhx;t = 0 in (A11) yields the steady-state value of L
h
x;t
given by
Lhx =
1 +Rh
+Rh + h(1 + hRh)(1 +Rh)

1 +

'h

. (A12)
Substituting (A12) into (A10) and rearranging terms yield the steady-state value of Lhr;t in
(37). Similarly, substituting (A12) into (A9) yields the steady-state value of Lht in (40).
Finally, we combine Lh;hx + L
f;h
x = L
h
x and (36) to derive the steady-state values of L
h;h
x and
Lf;hx in (38) and (39).
Proof of Proposition 4. The analogous expression of (47) for U f is given by
U f = (1 ) lnLf;fx + lnLf;hx +
(1  )('f ln zf )

Lfr +
('h ln zh)

Lhr +
f ln(1 Lf ). (A13)
The analogous expressions of (37)-(40) in country f are
Lfr =
  1
+Rf + f (1 + fRf )(1 +Rf )

1 +

'f

  
'f
, (A14)
Lf;fx = (1  )Lfx =
(1  )(1 +Rf )
+Rf + f (1 + fRf )(1 +Rf )

1 +

'f

, (A15)
Lh;fx = L
f
x =
(1 +Rf )
+Rf + f (1 + fRf )(1 +Rf )

1 +

'f

, (A16)
Lf = 1  
f (1 + fRf )(1 +Rf )
+Rf + f (1 + fRf )(1 +Rf )

1 +

'f

. (A17)
Under inelastic labor supply, we set h = f = 0 in (37)-(40) and (A14)-(A17). Then, we
substitute the resulting expressions into Uh + U f from (47) and (A13) and di¤erentiate it
with respect to fRh; Rfg to obtain the optimal nominal interest rates given by
Rh = max

  
h

h   1 ; 0

, (A18)
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Rf = max

  
f

f   1 ; 0

, (A19)
where 
h  (1 + 'h=) ln zh > 1 and 
f  (1 + 'f=) ln zf > 1. Therefore, fRh ; Rfg =
fRhne; Rfneg in (53) and (54). As for the comparative statics, Rh is decreasing in 
h, which in
turn is increasing in 'h and zh but decreasing in . Similarly, Rf is decreasing in 

f , which
in turn is increasing in 'f and zf but decreasing in .
Proof of Proposition 5. In the absence of the CIA constraint on consumption, we
set h = f = 0 in (37)-(40) and (A14)-(A17). The government in country h chooses Rh
to maximize the welfare of the representative household in country h. We substitute (37),
(38), (40), (A14) and (A16) under h = f = 0 into Uh in (47) and then di¤erentiate it
with respect to Rh to obtain the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rate Rhne in country h
given by (60). Similarly, the government in country f chooses Rf to maximize the welfare
of the representative household in country f . We substitute (A14), (A15), (A17), (37) and
(39) under h = f = 0 into U f in (A13) and then di¤erentiate it with respect to Rf to
obtain the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rate Rfne in country f given by (61). As for
the comparative statics, Rhne in (60) is decreasing in 
h, which in turn is decreasing in ;
therefore, Rhne is increasing in . Similarly, R
f
ne in (61) is decreasing in 
f , which in turn
is also decreasing in ; therefore, Rfne is also increasing in . The cooperative governments
choose fRh; Rfg to maximize the welfare of both domestic and foreign households. We set
h = f = 0 in (37)-(40) and (A14)-(A17) and substitute the resulting expressions into
Uh + U f from (47) and (A13). Then, we di¤erentiate Uh + U f with respect to fRh; Rfg to
obtain the optimal nominal interest rates given by (62) and (63), in which 	h and 	f are
both independent of .
Proof of Proposition 6. In the absence of the CIA constraint on R&D, the equilibrium
labor allocations fLhr ; Lh;hx ; Lh; Lfr ; Lh;fx g are given by (65)-(69). For the Nash-equilibrium
nominal interest rate Rhne in country h, we substitute (65)-(69) into U
h in (47) and then
di¤erentiate it with respect to Rh. We nd that
@Uh
@Rh
=  
hh (1  )  1 + ='h


1 + h
 
1 + hRh
2
"
(1  )  1 + hRh  1
Lh;hx
 
1 + hRh
 + (  1)'h

ln zh
#
. (A20)
Equation (A20) shows that as  ! 1, the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rate is Rhne =
=[h (1  )] > 0, which is increasing in . Furthermore, if  is su¢ ciently large, then
@Uh=@Rh < 0 for all values of Rh; in this case, Rhne = 0. The analogous expressions of
(65)-(69) for fLfr ; Lf;fx ; Lf ; Lhr ; Lf;hx g are
Lfr =
(  1)=
1 + f (1 + fRf )

1 +

'f

  
'f
, (A21)
Lf;fx =
(1  )=
1 + f (1 + fRf )

1 +

'f

, (A22)
27
Lf = 1  
f (1 + fRf )
1 + f (1 + fRf )

1 +

'f

, (A23)
Lhr =
(  1)=
1 + h(1 + hRh)

1 +

'h

  
'h
, (A24)
Lf;hx =
=
1 + h(1 + hRh)

1 +

'h

. (A25)
For the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rate Rfne in country f , we substitute (A21)-(A25)
into U f in (A13) and di¤erentiate it with respect to Rf . We nd that
@U f
@Rf
=  
ff (1  )  1 + ='f


1 + f
 
1 + fRf
2
"
(1  )  1 + fRf  1
Lf;fx
 
1 + fRf
 + (  1)'f

ln zf
#
. (A26)
Equation (A26) shows that as  ! 1, the Nash-equilibrium nominal interest rate is Rfne =
=[f (1  )] > 0, which is increasing in . Furthermore, if  is su¢ ciently large, then
@U f=@Rf < 0 for all values of Rf ; in this case, Rfne = 0. As for the optimal nominal
interest rates fRh ; Rfg, we add Uh from (47) and U f from (A13) and substitute (65)-(69)
and (A21)-(A25) into Uh + U f . Then, we di¤erentiate Uh + U f with respect to fRh; Rfg
and nd that
@(Uh + U f )
@Rh
=  hh
"
hRh
1 + h
 
1 + hRh
  
1 + hRh
 + (  1)  1 + 'h= ln zh


1 + h
 
1 + hRh
2
#
< 0,
(A27)
@(Uh + U f )
@Rf
=  ff
"
fRf
1 + f
 
1 + fRf
  
1 + fRf
 + (  1)  1 + 'f= ln zf


1 + f
 
1 + fRf
2
#
< 0.
(A28)
Therefore, given the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rates, it must be the case that
fRh ; Rfg = f0; 0g.
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Appendix B: Not for publication
In this appendix, we show the conditions under which f
h;
f ;	h;	f ;h;fg > 1. First,
we derive the rst-best allocations of labor. Combining (47) and (A13) yields
(Uh + U f ) = (1  )(lnLh;hx + lnLf;fx ) + (lnLh;fx + lnLf;hx ) +
'h ln zh

Lhr +
'f ln zf

Lfr
+h ln(1  Lh) + f ln(1  Lf ). (B1)
The social planner maximizes (B1) subject to the following resource constraints:
Lh;hx + L
f;h
x + L
h
r = L
h, (B2)
Lf;fx + L
h;f
x + L
f
r = L
f . (B3)
The rst-best optimal allocations of R&D labor and labor supply in country h are
Lhr = 1 
(1 + h)
'h ln zh
> 0, (B4)
The parameter restriction on Lhr > 0 implies 	
h > 1. To see this result, from (63),
	h > 1,

1 +
'h


ln zh
1 + h
> 1. (B5)
From (B4), we see that
Lhr > 0,

'h


ln zh
1 + h
> 1. (B6)
Therefore, if Lhr > 0, then 	
h > 1. An analogous procedure in country f would show that if
Lfr > 0, then 	
f > 1. In the case of elastic labor supply, we have

h > 1,

1 +
'h


ln zh > 1, (B7)
Lhr jh=0 > 0,

'h


ln zh > 1. (B8)
Therefore, if Lhr jh=0 > 0, then 
h > 1. An analogous procedure for country f would show
that if Lfr jf=0 > 0, then 
f > 1.
In the rest of this appendix, we consider the following alternative maximization problem:
a social planner representing only country h unilaterally maximizes
Uh = (1 ) lnLh;hx + lnLh;fx +
(1  )('h ln zh)

Lhr +
('f ln zf )

Lfr + 
h ln(1 Lh) (B9)
subject to (B2) and the equilibrium condition in (36), which ensures that Lf;hx and L
h;f
x are
positive. In this case, the planners allocation of R&D labor in country h is
Lhr = 1 
(1   + h)
(1  )('h ln zh) > 0. (B10)
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The parameter restriction on Lhr > 0 implies 
h > 1. To see this result, from (60),
h > 1, 1  
1   + h

1 +
'h


ln zh > 1. (B11)
From (B10), we see that
Lhr > 0,
1  
1   + h

'h


ln zh > 1. (B12)
Therefore, if Lhr > 0, then 
h > 1. An analogous procedure in country f would show that if
Lfr > 0, then 
f > 1.
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Appendix C: Not for publication
In this appendix, we present the equilibrium conditions in the presence of R&D subsidies
nanced by a distortionary wage-income tax in each country. In this case, (33)-(36) become
Lhr =
  1
(1  sh)(1 +Rh)L
h
x  

'h
, (C1)
Lh = 1  
h(1 + hRh)Lhx
1  h , (C2)
Lh;hx + L
f;h
x + L
h
r = L
h, (C3)
Lf;hx =

1  L
h;h
x . (C4)
To close this system of equations, we use the following balanced-budget condition:
sh(1 +Rh)Lhr = 
hLh. (C5)
Therefore, we can solve the ve endogenous variables fLhr ; Lh; Lh;hx ; Lf;hx ; hg using (C1)-(C5).
There is a set of analogous equations in country f .
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